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SIGNATURE AND ILLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE 
BAROQUE FOR ‘TRUTH’ IN LAW, ARTS AND 
HUMANITIES 
Richard Mohr* 
Abstract. Basic to contemporary problems in the disciplines of representation and interpretation is 
a split between a naïve acceptance of bare facts, presumed to exist in their own ‘objective’ world of 
objects, and the actions of subjects who interpret an intersubjective world. The solution is sought in 
some ‘new’ epistemologies: Martín Alcoff, Grosz, Kristeva, Butler, as well as in Benjamin and 
Gadamer, who look back to older ways of knowing. The methodology is an archaeology of these 
ways of knowing, focussed on a crucial transition in the understanding of representation between 
the renaissance and the baroque. It uses quintessential methods of the humanities: narrative, 
keywords and critique. The narrative tracks two keywords of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, signature and illusion (inganno), through their uses in renaissance science and baroque arts 
and philosophy. Following the enlightenment split between the understanding of the arts or 
humanities and sciences, the keywords re-emerge in familiar contemporary legal forms: the signature 
as an efficacious performative; illusion as ideology and repression. The truth in law, as in the arts 
and humanities, is built up from interrogation of representations, prior understanding, and 
comprehension of human motivation. For this it needs a hermeneutics based in tradition and 
memory. Since representations and interpretations can be vehicles for rationalisation and repression, 
there is also need for a critical hermeneutics, which may find truth in unexpected places, such as the 
repressed memory uncovered in an old ritual or image. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
New interest in ‘the humanities’, particularly from scholars of law, has many manifestations and a 
number of sources. It can be seen in initiatives such as two new journals on law and humanities 
started in 2005 and 2007 in the USA and UK respectively, in the recent establishment of the 
Australian Consortium of Humanities Research Centres (ACHRC), or in Martha Nussbaum’s 
work on the importance of the humanities (which followed her work on ‘humanity’ and the law).1 
Among the sources of this interest appear to be both push and pull factors.  
                                                          
*  Director, Social Research Policy & Planning, and Visiting Professorial Fellow in the Legal Intersections Research Centre, 
Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. rmohr@srpp.com.au. A version of this paper was given as the keynote address 
to the International Conference on Arts, Ideas and the Baroque, at the 9th Montreal Baroque Festival, ‘Péchés capiteaux’. 
24-25 June 2011. The author acknowledges the generous support and encouragement of Professor Desmond Manderson 
and Dr Leigh Yetter, Institute for the Public Life of Arts and Ideas, McGill University, Montreal. 
1  Nussbaum Martha C. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities Princeton University Press Princeton 2010; 
Nussbaum Martha C. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law Princeton University Press Princeton 2004 
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On one hand, there is the threat posed by a certain neglect of knowledge and of disciplines 
that do not feed directly in to ‘economic’ pursuits. The arts and humanities are ‘[s]een by policy-
makers as useless frills at a time when nations must cut away all useless things in order to stay 
competitive in the global market’.2 It is a theme that has rapidly come to the fore in the UK with 
the 2010 report of the Browne review to the Conservative government, which suggests an end to 
subsidies for all courses except medicine, science, engineering and modern languages.3 Disciplines 
that are not oriented to technology or the economy feel threatened and are drawing up the 
wagons around a common area that is called, in an almost residual sense, ‘humanities’. 
On the more positive side, there is a broadening of perspectives. After ‘law and society’, 
‘law and literature’, critical legal studies and the rapid expansion in the late twentieth century of 
cultural studies4, it has seemed increasingly artificial to put interdisciplinary studies of law and 
legal phenomena into such silos. Interdisciplinarity and an impatience with artificial boundaries 
are also characteristic of the broader humanities ‘movement’, exemplified in the interests and 
discussions among members of the ACHRC. In legal studies and the humanities there is a sense 
that the streams have converged and we can begin to discern the outlines of a fine river. 
From this quick description of recent moves in law and the humanities, we can see both 
exclusive and inclusive forces. Humanities is not science, not technology. It is a concern with a 
wide range of pursuits including arts, history, culture, ideas and media. Moreover, it takes a 
particular interest in the connections between those areas. In trying to define our areas of interest in 
law and the humanities it is important to keep these common understandings in mind, while at 
the same time seeking a better understanding of the foundations and strengths of the humanities, 
particularly at their interface with legal phenomena.  
Law and the humanities focus on human cultural products, including art and media as well 
as texts such as legal, historical and literary documents. The need for interpretation is common to 
all of these interests. In what follows I explore the nature of interpretation and its role in the 
humanities and culture. My intention is to explore some common methodological foundations for 
the humanities. This is an epistemological program, asking the question: how do we know? 
Because it is not divorced from practice (whether scholarship or social, cultural or legal practice), 
it also has an ontological dimension, which refers to the conditions of social life and practice: 
how do we live (together)? 
This article begins by identifying contemporary problems in the disciplines of 
representation and interpretation. Basic to these is a split between a naïve acceptance of bare 
facts, presumed to exist in their own ‘objective’ world of objects, and the actions of subjects who 
                                                          
2  As above (2010) at 2. 
3  Shepherd Jessica. 2010. ‘Browne review: Universities warned to expect £4.2bn cuts’ The Guardian. 15 October 2010. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/oct/15/browne-review-universities-cuts?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 
accessed 30 January 2012. 
4  This ‘cultural turn’ has been echoed in a ‘spatial turn’ and a ‘pictorial turn’. The latter is of particular relevance to the 
rediscovery of the baroque and the subject matter of this article. See for example Delaney David ‘Semantic Ecology and 
Lexical Violence: Nature at the Limits of Law’ (2001) 5 2 Law Text Culture 77-112; Hess-Lüttuch Ernst W. B. ‘Spatial 
Turn: On the Concept of Space in Cultural Geography and Literary Theory’ (2011) 9-10 Lexia 23-42 and, on the ‘pictorial 
turn’, chapter 1, of that name, in Mitchell W J T Picture Theory. Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 1994 
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interpret an intersubjective world. The problem is illustrated by instances of deception in politics 
and misconceptions of law. The solution is sought in some ‘new’ epistemologies, of recent 
feminists as well as Walter Benjamin and Hans-Georg Gadamer, which look back to older ways 
of knowing. To unearth the archaeology of these ways of knowing, I go back to a crucial 
transition in the understanding of representation between the renaissance and the baroque.  
My methodological process is an exercise in showing by doing. In seeking to elucidate the 
foundations of the humanities, I plan to use quintessential methods of the humanities: narrative, 
keywords and critique. My narrative is based on the historical trajectory of two keywords of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: signatura and inganno; signature and delusion.5 At the first 
appearance of these keywords, their original meanings and uses are explained. The narrative 
resumes to trace their fortunes, through the changing understanding of the uses of 
representation, and the divergent epistemological foundations of the sciences and the arts. 
Between the shores of object and subject, sundered by the enlightenment, the humanities were 
left isolated in the torrent. In conclusion the keywords re-emerge in familiar contemporary legal 
forms: the signature as an efficacious performative; delusion as ideology and repression. In these 
guises they have offered new direction for research in law and the humanities, in exploring the 
interactions between subjects and objects, people and things, power and pictures. 
Seeing these key concepts through the fresh eyes of the baroque opens new possibilities 
for understanding and critique. The signature, as a legal performative, really does change the civil 
world. Games of illusion once again reveal truths in art and the power of dreams. The baroque 
discovered not only that appearances may deceive, but that they may be used to deceive. 
Representations, as ‘entities that don’t sleep’, are the stuff of social power. Without them our 
social interactions would be ephemeral, a social order rebuilt every morning, as in Serres’s 
‘unstable band of baboons [where] social changes are flaring up every minute’.6 We rely on 
concrete representations, embodied in objects, in law and all other practices of the social order. 
We also need an informed scepticism, a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, that allows us to decode the 
repressive languages of power and to distinguish the truth, in art, law or politics, from the 
deception. 
2.0 PRACTICAL PROBLEMS—EPISTEMOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS? 
Law and the humanities are both based on representation and interpretation. They conjure 
images, combine words and inquire into the meanings and uses of those constellations. These 
activities are neglected in many areas of scholarship and public life, replaced by a naïve 
                                                          
5  In what follows I will generally prefer the Italian word inganno or the Spanish equivalent engaño, since they carry a deeper 
meaning than ‘delusion’ or ‘illusion’ and imply trickery, as does the French trompe. I hope their meaning will be explicated 
by reference to primary sources in Italian and in Spanish. 
6  Serres Michel Genesis University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor 1995 at 87. The example has been elaborated by Latour and 
Strum: see Latour Bruno Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory Oxford University Press Oxford 
2005 at 69-70. 
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empiricism: ‘WYSIWYG’—‘what you see is what you get’—in the jargon of the dotcom decade; 
‘facts’ (‘not assertions’), to quote Colin Powell’s description of the grainy images he showed the 
United Nations on 3rd February 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq.7  
Powell’s performance at the United Nations highlights one of the key reasons we need to 
rediscover methods appropriate to the arts and humanities. He expressly denied the need to 
interpret his pictures or audio grabs of intercepted phone calls. Instead he claimed they allowed 
unmediated access to ‘facts’. While Powell was staking a claim to unmediated factual knowledge, 
one of the greatest anti-war artworks of the twentieth century, a version of Picasso’s Guernica in 
the foyer of the UN building, had been shrouded over. The reason given by the UN authorities 
was that a plain surface was more suitable for press conferences. A member of the Australian 
Parliament, Laurie Brereton, considered it more plausible that it was to avoid embarrassment to 
the United States, in having its Ambassador or Secretary of State being seen to promote war with 
Iraq ‘against a backdrop depicting images of women and children and animals crying with horror 
and showing the suffering of war’.8 
Denying the need to interpret sense data–grainy images or scratchy recordings–Powell 
advocated the simple perception of ‘facts’. What we see is the truth, and it comes to us pre-
interpreted. We have direct access to facts. The shrouding of Guernica illustrated the subversive 
threat of art, of images. Guernica ‘depicts’ war in a very different way than Powell’s slide show. It 
must be interpreted, and knowing the story behind it helps. Guernica communicates in a more 
honest, and perhaps more powerful way than Colin Powell did. Conflicts like this, between 
immediate access to ‘facts’ and the ethical interpretation of art or texts, are often seen to 
represent a distinction between the sciences and the humanities. Yet interpretation underlies any 
approach to knowledge. 
Law, more than any other discipline, is based on interpretation. Hermeneutics is at its 
heart. Yet even law has succumbed to a sort of cultural cringe before the natural sciences, 
apologising for its arguments and recoiling from its representations.9 Despite the important 
contributions law made to western epistemology in renaissance times, there are now few scholars 
who recognise the value and broader relevance of forensic inquiry and legal interpretation and 
decision making.10 The fact-value distinction had its roots in the subtleties of jurisprudence, and 
yet is turned against the law in accusations that it is a ‘fraud … that obscures the truth’.11 Is there 
a form of truth appropriate to law? 
To compare the truth or honesty of a work of art, literature or law with that of ‘facts’ or 
documentary images is to inquire into the processes of representation and interpretation that go 
                                                          
7  As above Latour at 18. 
8  Brereton Laurie 2003. ‘Shroud over Guernica’ Sydney Morning Herald 5 February 2003. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/ 
2003/02/05/1044318661158.html accessed 11 January 2011. 
9  Sherwin Richard K. ‘Law, Metaphysics and the New Iconoclasm’ (2007) 11 Law Text Culture 70 –105. 
10  Hampshire Stuart Innocence and Experience Harvard University Press Cambridge MA 1989 at 54; Shapiro Barbara J A Culture 
of Fact: England 1550 –1720 Cornell University Press Ithaca 2000 at 10-11; Toulmin Stephen The Uses of Argument 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK 1964 at 7. 
11  Evan Whitton ‘The Law Report’ ABC Radio National 15 July 1997. The Chief Justice at the time accepted that law’s role 
was ‘not to pursue the truth’. Mason Sir Anthony The Future of Adversarial Justice, paper presented at the 17th AIJA Annual 
Conference, Adelaide, 7 August 1999. 
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into each. Gadamer reaches back across the enlightenment to rediscover a humanism which he 
traces from late Roman law to Vico, in the late baroque. It is characterised by an approach to the 
‘art and practice of law that is closer to the practical ideal of phronesis than the theoretical ideal 
of sophia’.12 It requires common sense, taste and judgment. Since the rupture of the methods of 
the human sciences and the arts from the natural sciences, under Kant’s influence, it is necessary 
to rediscover the common ground of hermeneutics, so that all our faculties13 can be brought to 
the task of interpretation, to discover the truth that is appropriate to the arts, humanities and law.  
Benjamin’s contribution to ways of knowing deriving from the baroque involves a new 
appreciation of the role of the object, the body part and the corpse.14 Benjamin’s is still an 
approach to epistemology–the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to his book on baroque Trauerspiel 
(German tragic drama) is his most sophisticated methodological statement–but in its approach to 
redeeming the objects, to recombining things, and deciphering allegories it encompasses ontology 
as well. To truly know something we must resonate with it, and so breach that Cartesian and 
Kantian firewall between subject and object, the knower and the known.15 Our world is 
populated by objects as much as by people and, like the baroque stage littered with corpses and 
rapiers, or the Vanitas painting with its skull and books, it must be interpreted with a full 
appreciation of the power of objects, emblems and allegory. 
These twentieth century rediscoveries of some older ways of knowing have reverberated 
also in feminist epistemology since the 1980s. The Cartesian subject-object distinction was 
interrupted by Kristeva’s notion of the abject, whose only point in common with the object is its 
opposition to the ‘I’, a subject.16 Yet it poses a fundamental threat to the self in its uncanny 
resemblance. If the corpse on the baroque stage, like the flat-lining encephalogram of Kristeva’s 
example, signifies death, the real, putrefying corpse indicates death, it points to it.17 This horror 
between subject and object, between self and its negation, calls forth the original repression of the 
abject, played out in religious, moral and legal codes.18 The religious crises of the baroque era 
witnessed a renegotiation of the abject, without ever resolving our ‘most intimate and serious 
apocalypses’.19 That would require the completion (‘achèvement’) of religion through a 
‘demystification of Power’ in all its social aspects: ‘religious, moral, political and verbal’.20 I will 
return, in the conclusion, to questions of demystification, critique of ideology and the overcoming 
of repression.  
                                                          
12  Gadamer Hans-Georg Truth and Method Continuum New York 1989 at 20. 
13  I intend ‘faculties’ in the sense that Chaïm Perelman uses it here: ‘People who argue do not address what we call ‘faculties’, 
such as intellect, emotion, or will; they address the whole person, but, depending on the circumstances, their arguments 
will seek different results and will use methods appropriate to the purpose of the discourse as well as to the audience to be 
influenced.’ Quoted Tindale Christopher W Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument State University of New York 
Press Albany 1999 at 4. It is an ironic and happy coincidence that in the present context it could also refer to the academic 
disciplinary boundaries. 
14  Benjamin Walter The Origin of German Tragic Drama NLB London 1977 (1928) at 132-9, 218. 
15  As above at 33-4. 
16  Kristeva Julia Pouvoirs de l’horreur: Essai sur l’abjection Éditions du Seuil Paris 1980 at 9. 
17  As above at 11. 
18  As above at 23, 247. 
19  As above at 246. 
20  As above at 247. 
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In other advances in feminist epistemology, Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s Baroque Reason 
highlights the baroque tropes that were central to Benjamin’s methods, ‘the Reason of the 
Other’.21 Linda Martín Alcoff bases her feminist and social epistemology on a reading of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics through the lens of the coherence theory of knowing.22 The common 
project here is the location of knowledge and the knower in a social space. Knowledge results 
from social activity, not passive reception. In common with Foucault, Martín Alcoff identifies 
knowledge with power, and champions ‘subjugated knowledges’: truth is ‘a strategic intervention 
into current discursive power relations’.23 Underlying each of these readings is a rejection of the 
Cartesian ‘dichotomy of knowing subject and known object’, which Grosz sees at the root of our 
recent ‘crisis of reason’ which privileges ‘the purely conceptual or mental over the corporeal’.24 
3.0 KEYWORD: SIGNATURE (NATURE AND SCIENCE) 
The new sciences of the renaissance paid particular attention to the evidence available in the 
natural world. Ficino held that earthly things are able ‘to channel (condurre) divine power to the 
human realm, drawing them together by means of their similitude’, their resemblance to 
significant celestial bodies.25 Paracelsus compiled a Compendium (op. post. 1567) of plants and their 
connections with parts of the body and their afflictions. In his Signatura Rerum, the ‘signature of 
the thing’, Paracelsus elaborated the idea that the appearance of a thing was a marker for its 
power or efficacy: plants have a direct link to the body parts they cure. Many of these visual 
associations can be found in the plants’ botanical names: pulmonaria works on the lungs, uvularia 
on the throat, and palma christi on the hands. For Paracelsus this was an unmediated power, 
exercised directly by the thing and indicated through its appearance. The signatura is the link 
between the outer and visible aspect of the thing, such as a plant, and its inner, invisible nature.26 
In the renaissance keyword of ‘signature’, the manifestation of a thing is the guarantee of its 
efficacy. 
Astrology studied the heavens and, working from the appearances of the constellations and 
the ancient personifications of the planets, sought links with human affairs. The stars and planets, 
like Paracelsus’ plants, exercised a certain unmediated power on Earth. The frescos from the early 
renaissance Palazzo Schifanoia in Ferrara illustrate the point. In twelve sets of three panels the 
top panel represents the dominant planet in the month depicted, while the bottom panel shows 
the main agricultural activities in that season, as well as other human activities under the influence 
of the heavens. There are twelve such sets of panels. The middle panels remained mysterious for 
centuries until, just one hundred years ago, Aby Warburg’s research into Arabic sources of 
                                                          
21  Buci-Glucksmann Christine Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity Sage London 1994 at 39. 
22  Martín Alcoff Linda Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory Cornell University Press Ithaca 1996 at 46-7. 
23  As above at 148-9. 
24  Grosz Elizabeth ‘Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason’ in Alcoff Linda and Potter Elizabeth (eds) 
Feminist Epistemologies Routledge New York & London 1993 p 187 at 187-89. 
25  Bianchi Massimo Luigi Signatura rerum: Segni, magia e conoscenza da Paracelso a Leibniz Edizioni dell’Ateneo Roma 1987 at 26. 
26  As above at 28 and see plates 2-3, where Fabricius illustrates the resemblance between the plant and the body part it cures. 
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renaissance astrology revealed them as ‘decani’, particular images of celestial bodies that played a 
part in human affairs. Warburg’s careful decoding of renaissance art and allegory became a model 
for twentieth century art scholarship, influencing the German tradition of both Benjamin and 
Gadamer. He concluded that astrological power in the renaissance was ‘a fetishism of names 
projected into the future’, so that, for example, one born under the sign of Venus would have 
qualities corresponding to those of the mythological Venus: love and the simple pleasures of 
life.27  
One small detail of the panels depicting March illustrates my theme of representation and 
the senses. Sense data—such as the appearance of a thing—was seen as a guarantee of the thing 
itself, of a fact. In the bottom panel depicting human activities, under a doorway labelled ‘Justice’, 
we see four of the five senses represented: by the eyes, an ear framed between two heads, a nose 
silhouetted against the doorway, and, below that, a hand. In this renaissance economy of 
representation, justice is dignified and guaranteed by association with such reliable and direct 
sensory testing of the real world. So in the fifteenth century there was seen to be a direct and 
reliable link between representation and reality. The discovery of perspective lent a guarantee of 
geometrical certainty to our representations of the world. This new science of perspective 
guaranteed the reliability of representation in paintings of landscapes and buildings, while the 
then respectable sciences of astrology and Paracelsian medicine confirmed these links. Law, as 
depicted in the Palazzo Schifanoia, required a true perception of the ‘facts’, relying on the senses.  
4.0 KEYWORD: INGANNO (THE BAROQUE)  
Foucault has termed the renaissance ‘the age of resemblance’, in reference to this innocent 
acceptance of the correspondence between the thing, its nature and our perceptions of it. By the 
seventeenth century this was overturned by the ‘games’ of the baroque era, ‘whose powers of 
enchantment grow out of the new kinship between resemblance and illusion’.28 Baroque art and 
architecture abound in trompe l’œil and virtuoso displays of illusion. Games of perspective give the 
illusion of depth, flat ceilings appear to rise up to the heavens, marble is carved into voluptuous 
folds of fabric.29 Galluzzi has contrasted the ‘scientific’ painting of the renaissance, with its 
fascination with perspective, to the ‘literary and rhetorical’ painting of the baroque, with its 
memento mori and allegorical depictions of Vanitas.30 Foucault draws attention to the baroque’s 
theatrical comic illusions and plays-within-a-play.31 Artworks ranging from the sculptures of 
                                                          
27  Warburg Aby Arte Italiana e astrologia internazionale nel Palazzo Schifanoja di Ferrara Abscondita Milano 2006 (1912) at 17. See 
also Agamben’s attribution to Warburg of the discovery of the signature, as ‘neither sign nor symbol’. Agamben Giorgio 
Signatura rerum: sul metodo Bollati Boringhieri Torino 2008 at 59. 
28  Foucault Michel The Order of Things Random House New York 1994 at 51. 
29  Examples can be found, respectively, in a chapel of Santa Cecilia in Trastevere where a marble bas relief no more than a 
couple of centimetres deep appears to recede into the distance, in the ceiling of Sant’Ignazio in Rome, and in numerous 
sculptures by Michelangelo as well as dozens of lesser known artists. 
30  Galluzzi Francesco Il Barocco Newton & Compton Roma 2005 at 37. 
31  Above note 28 at 51. 
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fantastical creatures in the ‘park of monsters’ at Bomarzo in northern Lazio, to the castrati’s arias 
in Vivaldi’s operas seek to inspire a sense of ‘meraviglia’, wonderment at the evocation of the 
impossible.  
The central keyword of the Italian baroque was inganno (Spanish engaño, French trompe): a 
trick, a sharp practice, an illusion, yes, but with a certain malicious intent, a delusion. It was born 
of the distrust and suspicion of the senses that arose at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
when, as Foucault points out: 
thought ceases to move in the element of resemblance. Similitude is no longer the form of 
knowledge but rather the occasion of error, the danger to which one exposes oneself when 
one does not examine the obscure region of confusions.32 
Among the three possible sources of the word ‘barocco’, in addition to the conventionally 
accepted ‘misshapen pearl’, is a medieval term for a sharp commercial practice, an ‘inganno 
economico e commerciale’ that came to refer to the devious tricks of card sharps.33  
Inganno is clearly untrustworthy and misleading; it can ensnare us in its net, by which it is 
identified in Ripa’s book of iconology.34 Yet the artists and architects of the baroque loved to play 
with illusion. This was intended to go beyond the moral homily, that motivated the Vanitas 
paintings for example, to say something about representation as such. In addition to commenting 
on the unreliability of the senses, it is also a means of demonstrating human intervention and 
creativity in representation. Humanity can meddle with the presentation of sensory experience to 
make something appear in a totally new way. The words of a Vivaldi aria invoke storms at sea as a 
means of inducing powerful and turbulent emotions in the audience. The staging and the 
architecture of the baroque were constantly experimenting with these illusions and trompe l’œil. 
They called attention to the inganno, or trompe, at the same time using it to emphasise that the 
world is open to interpretation and that these representations could be effective as a source of 
meraviglia, knowledge and even power. Powerful images are no longer just those presented by 
nature, but they include human artefacts. The baroque has cast doubt on the unmediated efficacy 
of natural objects, driven by their appearance, and has started to explore the tricks and games by 
which we are deluded. This brings our own, human-produced images into the frame. And now 
we enter a new phase of the games of representation: how society, law and the powerful 
themselves intervene in the civil world through images and delusions. 
                                                          
32  As above at 51. 
33  Above note 30 at 20. 
34  Leone Massimo ‘Rete: la metafora e lo strumento. La democrazia e i suoi attori, il controllo e le libertà ‘ (2002) Golem 
l’indispensabile; Ripa Cesare Iconologia Neri Pozza Vicenza 2000 (1618). 
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5.0 REPRESENTATION AND EFFICACY IN HUMAN AFFAIRS  
Following the Council of Trent in the mid to late sixteenth century, art and other forms of 
propaganda were enlisted in the battle against the Protestant reformation. The new approaches to 
representation and practices of political theology and Tridentine propaganda went hand in hand 
with a raised awareness of the socio-political power of art and of objects. The seventeenth 
century witnessed high levels of games and of serious social contests carried out at the level of 
representation. The arts and literature of the time explored both the theory and practice of 
representation and interpretation, amounting to ‘a convergence of political and philosophical 
experiments with visual and artistic ones’. 35  
The very concept of representation itself underwent important developments in this 
period.36 Hobbes’ Leviathan was an important argument for the sovereign as representative of the 
people, which was powerfully reinforced by the image on the frontispiece (1651), where the huge 
sovereign coming over the hill is made up of hundreds of tiny people. The sovereign ‘stands for’ 
the people in a symbolic sense which is reproduced descriptively in the engraving. The image has its 
own power.  
One of the key works of baroque drama is the Spanish play La Vida es Sueño (Life is a 
Dream, 1673) by Calderón de la Barca. The theme of the play is summed up in the often quoted 
last two lines of the hero Segismundo’s soliloquy, which give the play its title: 
… toda la vida es sueño, 
y los sueños, sueños son. 
Of greater interest, however, are three lines at the beginning of that soliloquy: 
Sueña el rey que es rey, y vive 
con este engaño mandando,  
disponiendo y gobernando 
 
The king dreams he is king, and lives 
with this delusion ordering, 
decreeing and governing …37  
All human relations, and the human condition itself, are no more than a dream. The king only 
dreams his sovereignty, just as the poor man dreams his misery. Yet this passage draws attention 
                                                          
35  Gamboni Dario ‘Composing the Body Politic: Composite Images and Political Representation, 1651 –2004’ in Latour 
Bruno and Weibel Peter (eds) Making Things Public –Atmospheres of Democracy ZKM and MIT Press Karlsruhe and 
Cambridge MA 2005 162-195 at 163. In connection with the religious conflicts of the seventeenth century I could also 
mention the importance of contested interpretations of the Bible, re-created as an object of wide consumption by the 
printing press. Calvo Serraller F. ‘Rennaissance to Baroque’ in Comadira Narcís (eds) La paraula figurada. La presència del 
llibre a les col.lections del MNAC Museu Nacional d’Art de Catalunya (MNAC) Barcelona 2005 . The interpretation of a text 
was thus problematised, just as nature, art and devices were. 
36  Pitkin Hanna Fenichel The Concept of Representation University of California Press Berkeley, CA 1972 
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to the social power of these dreams: dream as it may be, the king governs with this engaño. This 
‘with’ may be seen as something the king just has to live with, like someone ‘living with AIDS’, 
but it should also be seen in an instrumental sense: the king orders, decrees and governs ‘con este 
engaño’: by means of this delusion.  
Not only images but also other objects took on immense social and political power, seen 
both in arts and in the civic affairs of religion and politics. This was expressed in baroque theatre, 
where, as Benjamin points out, stage props became players in the action, often as the instruments 
of fate: he gives the example of the rapier in Hamlet. 38 Corpses and body parts, too, could play 
effective roles, in some ways more effective than live humans, who tended more to be buffeted 
by fate than to be masters of it. Benjamin quotes a late seventeenth century source: ‘The whole 
human body cannot enter a symbolical icon, but it is not inappropriate for part of the body to 
constitute it’.39 We may think here of the medieval and continuing Catholic cult of the relics of 
saints, which is also reflected in the Trauerspiel studied by Benjamin: ‘martyrdom prepares the 
body of the living person for emblematic purposes’.40 
As the body part represents and instantiates the power of the saint, metonymy became part 
of the new baroque political theology: the crown makes (or is) the king.41 Buci-Glucksmann 
describes the severed head as ‘a kind of figuration of desire, a trope in the precise sense’ of 
designating something that has no name.42 Objects and symbols had, since at least medieval 
times, been understood to invoke power. Before the baroque this had been a divine power, or the 
power of nature: the relic, crown, sceptre, constellation or medicinal plant. The baroque now 
understood this power as something that was effective for political purposes, and could be 
studied, invoked, ridiculed and manipulated for those purposes, at once deceptive and effective. 
Recognising the power of representation as a human artefact, and not simply a reflection of 
nature, opens the way to its conscious political use. Tropes and emblems are instances of this new 
economy of representation, self conscious and critical. These images and artifacts are recognised 
as human products yet are still capable of calling forth mysterious powers.  
6.0 A NEW SCIENCE  
We find another allegorical emblem towards the end of the baroque period, in 1730, in the 
frontispiece to Giambattista Vico’s New Science, which begins with a lengthy ‘explanation’ of the 
picture. A woman with winged temples is ‘metaphysic’, or the new science itself. The jewel on her 
breast is illuminated by God through his providence. She contemplates God ‘in an attitude of 
ecstasy’ at a higher level than the world of nature, which had been the concern of the 
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philosophers up to that time. Vico’s science ‘contemplates in God the world of human minds … 
to show His providence in … the civil world or world of nations’. 43 The human institutions of 
writing, cultivation, navigation, music, commerce, law and government are represented by various 
objects or ‘hieroglyphs’ on the ground: the scales of justice, a rudder, text. The imbalance of the 
philosophers’ hitherto focus on the natural world, to the exclusion of the world of human 
institutions and culture, is signified by the globe of the natural world being only half supported by 
the altar. Later in the book, Vico writes of ‘the never failing light of a truth beyond all question’:  
[T]he world of civil society has certainly been made by men so that its principles can and 
must be discovered within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on 
this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study 
of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should 
have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which since men have made 
it, men could come to know.44  
This is not a detached study that absorbs all knowledge into itself: the jewel on the woman’s 
breast refracts the light outwards again, to illuminate ‘public moral institutions’. Again Vico draws 
the contrast with prior philosophy, in a passage redolent of Marx’s, that the philosophers have 
missed the point, which is to ‘change’ or act in the world. Vico’s new science, then, is a study of 
culture, law and human institutions that analyses myth, history and philology in order to seek an 
empathetic understanding of and through other human minds. It is a public and moral science, a 
‘philosophy of authority’ that seeks to act back into the social and political world.45  
Let’s take stock, now, of this overview of the baroque’s new approach to knowledge and 
representation, before moving on to see how it was submerged in the enlightenment before being 
rediscovered in the twentieth century. The renaissance had taken very seriously the appearances 
or manifestations of the natural world, whether of plants or planets. It studied such objects to 
gain insight into their efficacy, their force in the world. The baroque questioned such literal 
acceptance of the evidence of our senses: not only might sense perception be unreliable, it may 
also offer a means by which we are tricked or deceived. The political theology of representation 
was present everywhere, from the cities to the theatres, the churches to the courts. In each of 
these stage-like settings (mise-en-scène, palcosceni) the power of objects became their social 
power. The analysis of appearances could shift from the natural world to the social, to 
comprehend culture and its political ramifications. The edge was blurred between knowing and 
doing, between epistemology and ontology. We could now interpret the social world as our own 
products, in linguistic and visual terms. 
These were the lessons of the baroque that had been the subject of plays, paintings and 
emblems, and that were distilled into a ‘study method’ by Vico.46 And yet these lessons were 
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submerged by other approaches to knowledge and the sciences that led to the contemporary 
malaise that I described at the beginning of this article. They are the lessons that we need to re-
learn from the baroque. Before describing how they were rediscovered in the twentieth century, it 
is important to understand what went wrong. What interrupted our self awareness of the arts and 
civic institutions? To ask such a question is to go to the heart of law and the humanities, studies 
based squarely in that self awareness. 
The period between the baroque and the twentieth century was dominated by a 
‘metaphysic’ or science very different to Vico’s. Bacon and Descartes stand at the beginning of 
this new history of science. Both were baroque figures in their own ways, yet they led science into 
new directions. Bacon shared the baroque suspicion of the senses: his famous doctrine of the 
idols that beset thought included one reminiscent of the inganno that ensnares us. The error of 
believing that things were connected by their resemblances was the ‘idol of the tribe’.47 Descartes’ 
mind-body dualism was typical of the baroque,48 as was his mistrust of the spontaneous evidence 
of the senses. To overcome the latter he proposed measurement and order, to calibrate difference 
and identity.49  
This gap between the conceptions of our mind and the natural world had to be overcome 
in order to establish a reliable empirical science, a science of the ‘outside’ world. Kant provided 
the solution. Science can develop adequate conceptions of things, to which the phenomena 
conform.50 Representations no longer attempt a resemblance of the physical world, which can be 
so deceptive, as baroque art had demonstrated. Instead, the phenomena conform to our a priori 
representations, so the thought precedes the phenomenon. This is a Vichian effort: what we 
know is a product of our own mind. But unlike Vico, who confined his study to the social world, 
already a creature of the human mind, Kant declared a reliable link to the empirical, ‘outside’ 
world. All our measuring devices are directed towards testing the reliability of the connection 
between our conceptions or representations and the observed phenomena. Physics became the 
‘queen of the sciences’ and scientific laws of observable nature became the dominant way of 
knowing. Facts were immediately apparent to the mind and had to correspond with the 
phenomena. 
7.0 DIVERGENCE OF THE ARTS: SYMBOL AND ALLEGORY 
But if our conceptions are all objectively reliable and verifiable representations of an outside 
world, where does that leave art and the humanities? Having done such a good job, in the 
baroque, of discrediting sense experience, art was now to pay the price. Kant took on that 
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challenge as well, and relegated the aesthetic to the realm of the subjective, as Gadamer has 
explained:  
The radical subjectivization involved in Kant’s new way of grounding aesthetics was truly 
epoch-making. In discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge except that of natural 
science, it compelled the human sciences to rely on the methodology of the natural sciences 
in conceptualizing themselves. But it made this reliance easier by offering the "artistic 
element", "feeling", and "empathy" as subsidiary elements.51  
If science was now about the objective apprehension of phenomena that guaranteed the 
‘facts’, art took the opposite direction. Taste became subjective, and the romantic conception of 
inexplicable genius could develop. Art was to be understood as raw experience (Erlebniskunst), 
and not a foundation for analysis, critique and interpretation. The romantic appreciation of art is 
all in our feelings: if our objective conceptions can lead to natural science through reliable 
correspondence to reality, our subjective tastes lead us to swoon before beauty. Whether we are 
confronting natural or artistic beauty, the response was to be subjective, unshared, overwhelming 
experience.  
Gadamer and Benjamin led the twentieth century’s efforts to rethink this obscurantist 
dilemma (both in the arts and the human sciences) by going back to the baroque allegory. They 
rethought the economy of representation by reclaiming the allegory as a way of knowing. In the 
post-Kantian romantic era, the symbol became the dominant form of representation. The symbol’s 
meaning is immediately apparent: it inheres in the form. Exhibiting a badge of identity–a 
templar’s cross, a national flag or a corporate logo–forms an instant association with the group to 
which we belong.52 Benjamin referred to this as the ‘paradox of the theological symbol’: the 
material symbol and the abstraction for which it stands are collapsed into a single unity of 
appearance and essence.53 The symbol is taken in at a glance: we either get it or we don’t. 
Expressed in symbolist art that flourished in the late nineteenth century, the image releases a 
charge of emotions which are presumed to reverberate instantly in the viewer.54 
The allegory, on the other hand, must be read. It presumes a lexicon of meanings that are 
based in tradition, in a long-running social context. Its interpretation is not subjective, depending 
on the artist or the viewer to bring their own genius to it. An interpretation can be more or less 
accurate, better connected to the tradition from which it springs, more or less rich in 
understanding. This is what Gadamer means by ‘truth in art’. Through it we can overcome the 
fragmented subjectivism of individual takes on a single work so that art may fulfill its role in ‘the 
task of preserving the hermeneutic continuity which constitutes our being’.55  
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The groundwork for this new appreciation of meaning and interpretation had been laid by 
an important group of German art historians inspired particularly by Aby Warburg, mentioned 
earlier, in the context of deciphering the meanings of the frescos in the Palazzo Schifanoia by 
tracing the influence of Arabic astrological writings on the artists and their circle. Both Benjamin 
and Gadamer looked back to the baroque as an age of allegory. Benjamin found in it a flourishing 
of meanings and their opposites that guided his esoteric explorations. For Gadamer, it was the 
last age in which the shared dogma of Europe was able to guide interpretation.  
These divergent interests led to different issues for our own studies in law and the 
humanities. Gadamer sees allegory as a means of knowing, of finding truth. His intention is 
epistemological, an exercise in understanding, thinking and knowing (which, as Foucault notes, ‘is 
always allegorical’).56 But if it is no longer guided by a shared dogma, how are we to save 
hermeneutics from a hopeless partisanship in the contests of ideas? The critical edge of 
hermeneutics comes into play in this new era when, in Kristeva’s terms, the old codes of religion 
and ideology no longer suffice to purify and repress the threatening abject. The allegorical 
memento mori or Vanitas painting signifies death in a stylised manner, as food for thought. The 
symbolist painting comes to the fore in an era when religious feeling is reduced to psychology and 
emotion, ‘shivers and goosebumps’ in Agamben’s terms.57 The repressed returns with the 
twentieth century’s ‘great demystification of power’.58 Freud’s critique of repression, or Marx’s 
critique of ideology, give rise to an alternative hermeneutics of suspicion, more critical than 
Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutics of tradition’ and its close reading of the dogmas and meanings in which 
a text or image is rooted. I return in section 9.0 of this article to this distinction and the ways it, 
too, draws on the baroque. First, I will address some key questions opened up by Benjamin’s 
interest in the power of things and in their links to ideas. In each of these concluding sections we 
may see different areas of relevance to contemporary problems, which are both methodological 
and practical: they concern the ‘study methods of our time’, as Vico put it, and they also 
illuminate the contradictions that were performed at the United Nations on February 5th 2003. 
These conclusions are organised into sections that revisit the two keywords with which I began: 
signatura and inganno. 
8.0 SIGNATURE 2 (THE PERFORMATIVE) 
The power of things has been rediscovered anew since Benjamin’s work on the baroque. From 
Austin’s performative to Latour’s actor network theory, the past half century has seen well-
known explorations of the role played by objects and signs in the social world.59 Of particular 
importance to law have been the explorations of the signature, as a reiterated performative 
                                                          
56  ‘L’analyse de la pensée est toujours allégorique.’ (emphasis in original) Foucault Michel L’archéologie du savoir Gallimard Paris 
1969 at 42. 
57  Agamben Giorgio Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Stanford University Press Stanford, CA 1998 at 78. 
58  Above note 16 at 247. 
59  Austin J. L. How To Do Things With Words Oxford University Press Oxford 1980; Latour, above note 6. 
SIGNATURE AND ILLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE BAROQUE FOR `TRUTH' IN LAW, ARTS AND HUMANITIES 
59 
gesture, by Derrida and Butler.60 Before further consideration of that work, I would like to 
explore, though Benjamin, the links and differences between the renaissance notion of the 
signature and the phenomenon so central to current studies of law. Benjamin’s interest in the 
power of things links the ontological and the epistemological. Benjamin sought not to match 
phenomena to existing mental concepts but to redeem them, so that they could ‘participate in the 
existence of ideas’, by representing them.61 This is by no means Kant’s one-to-one fit between the 
concept and the phenomenon, but a dialectical process. In the manner of allegories, ideas are 
built up, put into practice, and recalled by their associations with things. That leads us to question 
how it is that objects and representations can enter into civic life and can change the social world. 
Law is one of the formal, recognised ways in which the social world–or the civic order–is 
definitively changed. Yet the means by which this could be done have been increasingly 
challenged by sceptical views of law. The force of law moves from being an article of faith to an 
intellectual problem: one solution involves the power of objects. Law relies on material 
manifestations for its records and proofs. Files, evidence, documents and signatures are the 
repository of law’s memory. Benjamin indicated the persistence of objects as the guarantee of 
loyalty: ‘every loyal vow or memory surrounds itself with the fragments of the world of things as 
its very own, not-too-demanding objects.’62  
In changing the social world, the performative act of making a vow or taking an oath 
requires a permanent trace. Unlike other speech acts that just describe the world, the 
performative utterance brings something into existence. If renaissance science was wrong to see 
the power or efficacy of natural objects in the pure manifestation of their appearance, we might 
still redeem this insight for the human sciences. The study of the performative leads us to see that 
in the English word itself, a ‘signature’ is something that has efficacy through its appearance. If I 
sign a document such as a contract or a cheque, I have created a binding relationship that affects 
me and others. This new relationship brings something into being in the social matrix that did not 
exist before.  
Derrida contributed the insight that the performative act, including the signature, must be 
a repetitive ritual; that it partakes of a system of social power, which can even be subverted.63 
Butler further developed the notion that the very power inherent in the repeated citation of a 
performative formula can also be turned back on, or more subtlely remake the political or legal 
order. 
Thus, performativity has its own social temporality in which it remains enabled precisely by 
the contexts from which it breaks. This ambivalent structure at the heart of performativity 
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implies that, within political discourse, the very terms of resistance and insurgency are 
spawned in part by the powers they oppose….64 
The insight that a sign or a mark can be effective by being revealed may have led to a dead 
end in the natural sciences. God did not, after all, sign His works so they might guide us. 
However, when this idea is refracted into the social sciences, using the principles discovered by 
Vico, it leads to important insights. While scientists looking for manifest signs in the natural 
world lacked a viable research program, the examination of Vico’s ‘world of civil society’, that we 
ourselves have made, reveals that we can understand our own actions and their effects in that 
world. The study of the marks made by people, whether these be signatures or works of art, is 
open to interpretations through various means: semiotics, discourse analysis, hermeneutics or 
iconology. That these marks and objects do not only describe the world, but also make and 
remake it, is a characteristic insight of the baroque which was rediscovered in the twentieth 
century.65 Subsequent work revealed that these mechanisms of political power can themselves be 
an instrument of social change or subversion. These developments bring to the practices of the 
arts and law the scholarship they deserve. 
9.0 INGANNO 2 (HERMENEUTICS ) 
That these signs may sometimes deceive us is another powerful insight of the baroque. If signs 
and communications are used for social regulation, then it is important to have means for 
evaluating and criticising those constraints. The baroque games of inganno and trompe l’œil 
rehearsed in art the lessons that were explored by scholars and critics of law and civil society, 
from Calderón to Vico.  
Iconoclasm–suspicion of idols and fetishes–has a long history in the Abrahamic religions.  
Iconoclasm has a history at least as old as idolatry. … Indeed, one might argue that 
iconoclasm is simply the obverse of idolatry, that it is nothing more than idolatry turned 
outward toward the image of a rival, threatening tribe.66 
What was novel in the baroque was the playful exploration of appearance and illusion, and the 
political and philosophical critique of the relationship between the two. Gadamer revives an 
interest in games as a methodology: in this he follows Huizinga and was followed by Derrida.67 
They open up a world of possibilities, remove a fourth wall, so that play comes into focus as both 
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an aspect of interpretation and a component of social and legal communication. Gadamer 
distinguishes the ‘abundance of viewpoints’ this affords from the serious critique of ideology 
(another manifestation of iconoclasm). He finds it ‘frighteningly unreal when people like 
Habermas ascribe to rhetoric a compulsory quality that one must reject in favor of unconstrained, 
rational dialogue’.68 Ricœur has characterised this dispute between Gadamer and Habermas as the 
contest between a ‘hermeneutics of tradition’, based on ‘reminiscence’ and one based on 
‘suspicion’.69 While defending Gadamer’s appeals to tradition, Ricœur proposes, in juxtaposition, 
a critical hermeneutics, that sees the role of power relations in distortion and delusion. The 
negation of recognition (connaissance) of the other, of communication, is misrecognition 
(méconnaissance),70 which is ‘ peculiar to the problem of ideology.’ 
It can be analysed phenomenologically only by appealing to concepts of a psychoanalytic 
type: to illusion as distinct from error, to projection as constitution of a false transcendence, to 
rationalisation as the subsequent rearrangement of motivations according to the appearance of 
a rational justification.71  
The systematically distorted communication of ideology, in Habermas’s terms, can thus be 
best understood through psychoanalysis. In repression and in hegemonic domination we are 
overwhelmed by the burden of past events and distorted thoughts and communications. We can 
be dominated by ideas, images, dreams and objects. As in Calderón’s kingdom, we too are ruled 
by engaños, by these dreams of our rulers.  
The insights of the baroque, and an appreciation of its earnest games, allow an approach to 
interpretation that does not seek a binary distinction between the one truth and the many 
falsehoods, but which explores the foundations of our illusions. It is only by reviewing our 
illusions, and reinterpreting our dreams, that we can seek new knowledge, ‘mak[ing] it possible to 
incorporate our intuitions within an account of real knowing’.72 If it is a task of the human 
sciences to discover meaning through hermeneutics, it is also our task to interrogate the excesses of 
meaning in those objects, acts, or utterances that make and remake our social world. Where we 
discover this disconnect between the signified and the signifier, so that a symbol, myth or 
performative has an aura of excess meanings beyond its literal reference, we must ask not only 
what it means but what it does.73 To do this we can draw on a hermeneutics of suspicion and of 
tradition, while remembering the games of the baroque, that are always so good at revealing 
deception even as they deceive us. 
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10.0 CONCLUSION 
This inquiry began by highlighting the contemporary malaise which has seen law cut off from the 
humanities and cringing before a deracinated, positivist account of the dominant natural sciences. 
Law, the discipline that introduced the term ‘fact’ (fait, fatto)—what has been done—and 
modelled a new conception of laws of nature to explain those facts, was reduced to doubting its 
truths. In tracing a history that parallels the demise of law’s primacy as a method of knowing and 
deciding, we have seen that faith in law as a code gave way to doubt of law as an instrument of 
social power. Out of these doubts arose new methods, new understandings and, as I have been 
advocating here, new relevance for law’s affinities with the arts and humanities. A new world of 
inquiry and critique opened up once ‘the force of law’ became a problem to be solved, rather than 
a faith to be defended.  
Two rather ambitious questions led the charge: how do we know? and how do we live 
(together)? I cannot claim to have answered them, but their respective epistemological and 
ontological fields suggest points of reference for a summary of conclusions. These questions are 
connected by the common problem of the split between a knowing and doing subject and a 
passive, known object. Instead of stripping away our subjectivity to an inhuman object-ivity, the 
reunification of knowing and being can be better achieved by recognising the power of objects 
and the conditions of power over subjects.  
Objects, images and representations incorporate social power. They are coded or invested 
with meanings that function to remind us of certain social facts. Legal documents, the trappings 
of power, items of evidence: they remember for us. The renaissance belief in the signature of the 
thing turned out to be an unreliable indicator of God’s intention, but a valuable clue to social 
relations. Like any memories, those coded into objects are selective and open to reinterpretation. 
Indeed, they are re-remembered and subtlely changed with every recollection, invocation or 
iteration. Their power is not over-determined but is contingent on the performance of each new 
iteration, whether it be loyal and faithful or insurgent.  
Baroque demonstrations of the unreliability of the senses led to games of illusion. These 
games stimulated the playwrights and philosophers to wonder how deep they ran in social and 
political life. Life, for Calderón, was a dream. Just as dreams can be more or less life-like, can be 
interpreted this way or that, so representations can be recognised in many guises. In fact, in their 
guise as dreams and illusions, they can be misrecognised (méconnu), to use Ricœur’s terminology. 
That is to say, they can be vehicles for rationalisation and repression. Legal and religious codes 
and practices provide ample material for rationalisation and for analysis, from their imagery to 
their narratives, their theories and theologies. Even the naïve positivism born of half-understood 
notions of science and empiricism provide backing for imperialist efforts to justify war on the 
basis of purportedly uninterpreted ‘facts’. Through the conflicts of the reformation and the 
counter-reformation that enlisted and formed the baroque’s sensibilities, the ‘shared dogma’ of 
the west was shaken to its core. That first awakening from the ‘sleep’ of dominant religious and 
legal codes prepared the way for the ‘great demystification of Power’, the return of the repressed 
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that was opened up in the twentieth century.74 The insights of ideology critique and 
psychoanalysis added a critical edge to the new developments in methods based in hermeneutics 
and the performative. 
The truth in law, as in the arts and humanities, is a deep and complex construction built of 
representations and their interpretation. This interpretation is not just subjective, but 
intersubjective. It is not the immediate experience of the sublime, the swoon before beauty, or 
the uncritical acceptance of preinterpreted facts.75 It is built up from prior understanding, 
interrogation of the subject matter, comprehension of the motivations of other people, people 
like us. For this it needs a hermeneutics based in tradition and memory. Yet if we are not to be 
deluded by the preferred interpretations of the people with power, and the deceptions of those 
determined to cling to it, we can find truth in unexpected places: the slip of the tongue, the 
repressed memory uncovered in an old ritual or image, dreams of domination. z 
                                                          
74  Above note 16 at 246-7. 
75  Here ‘facts’ is written without the quote marks since it is used, without apology, in the legal sense: the accounts of deeds 
that are always open to scrutiny, interpretation and reinterpretation. 
